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DO JUDGES MAKE LAW?*
 
THE HON JUSTICE MICHAEL BARKER**
Unusually,  for  me  at  least,  I  would  like  to  commence  this  lecture  with  a  reading  from
Scripture; more particularly from what Christians call the Old Testament - from Judges 4:4
and 5: 
And Deborah, a prophetess, the wife of Lapidoth, she judged Israel at that time. And
she dwelt  under  the  palm tree  of  Deborah between Ramah and Bethel  in  mount
Ephraim: and the children of Israel came up to her for judgment.1
It seems this involved a personal approach to judging, something that was common in those
distant times in both the Jewish and Arabic worlds.
Recently, I was at the Alhambra in Granada, the palace and fort of the Moorish rulers of
Spain for hundreds of years until  Queen Isabella I and King Ferdinand II expanded their
northern  and  eastern  kingdoms  and  expelled  them  from Spain  in  1492.  I  found  myself
standing  in  the  famed  Court  of  Justice. Here,  the  ruler  is  said,  like  Deborah,  to  have
personally heard and resolved the disputes of his subjects.
From such direct decision making by rulers and judges, the expression “palm tree justice”
seems to have grown, especially during the 1960s in England. It was an expression I became
familiar with when I commenced law school in 1968. No real judge would dispense palm tree
justice,  was  the  clear  message.  In  making  a  judgment,  he  or  she  would  always  follow
precedent,  apply  settled  legal  rules,  and  never  appeal  to  broad  community  principles  or
values, or simply decide where the “justice” in the dispute appears to lie.
My topic for this evening’s lecture concerns this debate about judicial method. I have sought
to reduce it to the question, “Do judges make law?” Do they simply legislate from high, or
under a palm tree; or do they, in a more mechanistic way, simply seek to divine the resolution
of disputes by identifying settled principles and applying them to the facts of the case at hand;
* This article is a slightly edited version of the David Malcolm Memorial Lecture 2017 delivered by Justice
Barker at the Notre Dame University Law School in Fremantle on 26 October 2017.
** LLB(Hons) (UWA), LLM (York University, Canada); Justice of the Federal Court of Australia, Perth. 
1  The Holy Bible, King James Version (Thomas Nelson, 1984) Judges 4:4-5.
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or do they, in some third way, tend to combine both approaches, giving some rein to general
notions of justice?
I fear there are some who believe judges do just make it up as they go along and simply try to
deliver a judgment that supports the outcome they believe is just. And I fear equally there are
others who see the judicial job as involving a relatively simple task of declaring the law and
applying it to the facts to produce the outcome – something that a computer could do better,
and far more quickly and cheaply!
While I am not the first to ponder this question,2 I consider it still to be relevant. Indeed, I
have regularly asked myself the question over the 15 years I have been a judge. Am I making
law? The answer to the question, which I think is a version of the third way, takes us to the
nature  of  our  society  and  our  particular  form  of  government,  and  enables  us  to  better
understand the proper role judges play in it.
But first  let  me say what an honour it  is  to be presenting this, the third David Malcolm
Memorial Lecture at The University of Notre Dame Australia Law School here in Fremantle.
David  was the  towering legal  figure in  Western Australia  for  many of  my generation  of
lawyers. David made an enormous contribution to the legal life of the State in many guises
over a long career in the law.
He was a man of extraordinary energy, and when it came to the law he exhibited a great
creative energy as any, even an abbreviated, account of his career attests.
A  study  of  his  legal  work,  his  advocacy  and  his  judgments  discloses  David’s  broad
understanding that not only do judges, along with the lawyers who appear before them, help
maintain the democratic concept of the rule of law in our society, but also that they help to
fashion the law for the betterment of society in each generation.
David was a lawyer and a judge who had little doubt that judges have this  function and
responsibility,  and he plainly proceeded on that understanding in his advocacy and in his
judging.
2  See, eg, Ronald Sackville, ‘Why Do Judges Make Law? Some Aspects of Judicial Law Making’ (2001) 5(1)
University of Western Sydney Law Review 59; Murray Gleeson,  The Rule of Law and the Constitution (ABC
Books, 2001) 97.
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I first met David in the second year of my articles of clerkship, in 1973, when in the course of
organising  the  Australian  Legal  Convention  of  that  year  (coincidentally,  one  of  the  first
events held in the new Perth Concert Hall) he press-ganged Ralph Simmonds and me into
assembling a small army of articled clerks to assist him as supernumeraries – much like ball
kids at the Australian Open! David was then a lawyer on the move, just a few years away
from  taking  silk  and  accepting  part  time  appointments  as  Chair  of  the  Law  Reform
Commission  of  Western  Australia  and  the  nascent  Town  Planning  Appeals  Tribunal  of
Western Australia. David then was impossibly suave and debonair - especially to a 23 year
old beginner in the law, as I was at the time! He was also extremely charming, making it
nearly impossible to say “No” if he asked you to do something.
I got to know David better, how he thought and how he reasoned, when I became deeply
familiar with the Town Planning Appeals Tribunal decisions he delivered in the period 1980-
1986. My familiarity arose in the course first of teaching and practising planning law, and
later, as a successor to David as Chairman of that Tribunal. He was one of the true pioneers of
environmental planning law in this State. Until the Tribunal was established in 1979, there
was no such appeal tribunal governed by a body of law and principle, but only a Ministerial
appeal system so often characterised by palm tree justice and political whim. David set about
establishing a body of planning law and principle. He succeeded. It survives to this day. And
it has served the community well.
When I was appointed to the Supreme Court of Western Australia in 2002, David had been
the  Chief  Justice  for  some  14  years.  I  then  got  to  know  him  as  a  colleague.  He  was
welcoming and supportive of me as a new judge. He provided me with invaluable guidance
not only as a new judge, but also in relation to the establishment of the new SAT - the State
Administrative  Tribunal  of  Western  Australia. David,  as  Chair  of  the  Law  Reform
Commission had been a  major  contributor  to  that  Commission’s  report  on the reform of
administrative law in WA, which report had presaged the creation of the SAT.
As an advocate, David’s powers of persuasion are legendary. In the seminal High Court of
Australia  decision  of  Hewett  v  Court,3 David  Malcolm  QC  successfully  invited  three
members of the High Court, over the dissent of two others, to accept his analysis that his
client had an equitable lien over a partly constructed transportable home in respect of which
3  (1983) 149 CLR 639.
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the client had only made two progress payments at the time the builder became insolvent. He
invited the Court to take what seemed to be a new legal step, an extension in equity, in the
understanding that the Court could “make law” in that way.
The two dissenting judges, Wilson and Dawson JJ, in a joint judgment thought that: 
It is hardly surprising that equity has not extended those principles so far.  To do so in
this  case  would,  in  our  view,  introduce  unnecessary  complexity  into  the
ascertainment of the rights of the parties and would be destructive of that certainty
which is the basis of sound commercial practice.4
The three majority judges, however, took a different view. Gibbs CJ said: 
The fact that there is no authority precisely in point does not mean that in the present
circumstances no lien can arise. The rules of equity are not so rigid and inflexible that
it is necessary to discover precise authority in favour of the existence of a lien before
one can be held to have been created. I do not of course intend to suggest that the
courts may proceed on general notions of justice without regard to settled principles.
But  the  present  case  seems to me to fall  within the  principles  which govern the
creation of a purchaser’s lien.5
You  will  not  have  missed  the  counterpoints,  “general  notions  of  justice”  and  “settled
principles”.
Murphy J, in a characteristically short judgment of some five short paragraphs that focussed
on the justice of the case, was mostly influenced by the consideration that:
A charge such as  this  will  often be necessary to  protect  consumers,  who,  unlike
traders, cannot inquire into the solvency of the person with whom they are dealing.6
Deane  J,  an  esteemed  equity  lawyer,  in  a  much  longer  judgment  of  some 20 very  long
paragraphs,  concluded  that  the  partly  completed  home  had  been  “appropriated  to  the
performance of a contract”,7 and in the circumstances an equitable lien arose in favour of
David Malcolm’s client.
4  Ibid 659.
5  Ibid.
6  Ibid 650-651.
7  Ibid 668.
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As Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Western Australia, in Craig v Troy8 in 1997, David
Malcolm did not hesitate to nail his colours to the mast in the long-standing controversy
whether,  under  s  4(1)  of  the  Law  Reform  (Contributory  Negligence  and  Tortfeasors’
Contribution)  Act  1947 (WA),  damages  could  be  apportioned  between  a  plaintiff  and  a
defendant in a case where a breach of contract also constituted an act of negligence. David
held apportionment was open. This was good news for the defendants, and seemed just to me
as senior counsel for one of the defendants in that case!
One, however, must always be mindful, as a judge at least, that forays into lawmaking do not
always result in permanent contributions to the law. Two short years later, in 1999, the High
Court in Astley v Austrust Ltd9 reversed Chief Justice Malcolm’s determination that the 1947
Act operated in the way he had determined.10 
Mention of the High Court leads to the reminder that the High Court is the final court of
appeal and the constitutional court in Australia. It is charged with the ultimate responsibility
under  the  Australian  Constitution  of  determining  the  general  law  and  construing  the
Constitution, as it will tomorrow in relation to s 44 of the Constitution. What it says in that
regard will be the law. The High Court will thereby make law; though of course it didn’t
enact s 44.11
The High Court obviously has the greatest capacity of all Australian courts to make law.
Certainly that is what the High Court did in Mabo v Queensland (No 2)12 in 1992 when the
Court found native title survived the coming of the new British sovereign in Australia from
1788 onwards. It swept aside an understanding that indigenous rights were not recognised
under the newly received common law of England. In doing so, the court  recognised the
injustice of treating the indigenous peoples of Australia as trespassers in their own territories,
as the received legal theory to that point had.13 
8  (1997) 16 WAR 96.
9  (1999) 197 CLR 1.
10 Ibid 31 [68]. 
11 By way of prescript, the decision of the High Court was delivered on 27 October 2017 in Re Canavan, Re
Ludlam, Re Waters, Re Roberts (No 2), Re Joyce, Re Nash, Re Xenophon [2017] HCA 45.
12 (1992) 175 CLR 1.
13 See Michael Barker, ‘To Akiba and Beyond: Old Hopes and New Dreams for Native Title’ in Tim Bonyhady
(ed), Finn’s Law: An Australian Justice (Federation Press, 2016) 199.
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Mabo perhaps stands as a testament to the proposition that justice trumps received or settled
principle in some fundamentally important cases. The High Court is not bound to follow its
previous decisions, but it is a big step to decide not to follow them. Reopening a precedent
requires courage on the part of all concerned, counsel and the court. Certainty and longevity
of legal rules is part of the concept of the rule of law.
The position of intermediate courts of appeal - such as the full court of the Federal Court, on
which I sit a number of times a year, and the Western Australian Court of Appeal - are much
less free to pronounce the law or change the law in this regard. As a result of the High Court
decision in Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd14 in 2007, an intermediate court of
appeal must always apply not only an existing High Court decision that is on point, but also
that of another intermediate court of appeal.15 It can’t depart from a High Court precedent, but
it  can from another intermediate court  of appeal decision if  it  considers it  to be “plainly
wrong”.
Not all judges were enamoured with the High Court’s requirements in  Farah when it came
down. On one view it has the potential to stultify the development of the law. It prevents, if
you like, the application of Chairman Mao’s aphorism, “Let a hundred flowers bloom”. I can
say, as an appeal judge, it does make it easier for an appeal court to dispose of cases where
the precedent is clear. That doesn’t mean of course that intermediate appeal judges who aren’t
convinced as to the correctness of an existing precedent always pass up the opportunity to
make their views public! The rule does though mean that a party who wishes to see such a
precedent set aside must necessarily seek special leave to appeal to the High Court and then
succeed on the appeal if leave is granted.
For first instance, or trial judges, a similar rule applies. Not only are they, of course, bound by
High Court precedent and intermediate appeal court precedent, but they also, by a principle of
comity, decline to depart from a ruling by another first instance judge which is on point,
unless they consider it to be plainly wrong.
The  “plainly  wrong”  rule  is  not  an  easy  one  to  apply,  or  disregard.  It  requires  a  judge
sometimes to put aside their own strong views as to what is right and wrong in assessing
whether the other judge’s view is “plainly” wrong. In my experience this is not a state of
14 (2007) 230 CLR 89.
15 Ibid 151–152 [135].
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satisfaction easily  arrived at.  Not surprisingly,  the comity rule  results  in  few trial  judges
ignoring what their colleague has earlier found to be the law.
I should add that in 15 years of judging I have only had occasion once to apply the plainly
wrong test, and that was in relation to an extinguishment question arising under the Native
Title Act 1993 (Cth) where I said I considered an earlier full court was plainly wrong on the
issue. Fortunately for me, the High Court unanimously agreed!16 
The “plainly wrong” rule has the advantage that, in appropriate cases, intermediate courts of
appeal and the High Court control the development of Australian law. If it were otherwise,
the law might be the subject of varied expositions which would be inimical to certainty about
what the law is in a particular area,  possibly encourage forum shopping by litigants, and
generally lead to an undermining of confidence in the judicial system more generally.
That brings me back to Chief Justice Gibbs’ observation in Hewett v Court that courts do not
proceed on “general notions of justice without regard to settled principle”.
As I have suggested earlier, perhaps that is what some people think we judges actually do.
The role and function of judges, as I am suggesting, is more nuanced than that. In our system
of federal government for example, governmental power is distributed between three arms or
branches  of  government:  the  parliament,  the  executive  and the  judiciary.  The  parliament
legislates and so makes laws. The executive carries those laws into administrative effect and
exercises the powers given to it under the laws. The judiciary deals with the resolution of
disputes between citizens and others, including with the executive as to the limits of power,
including whether laws made by parliament are constitutionally valid.  The same position,
generally speaking, adheres in the Australian states and territories.
This  division,  as  we  know,  reflects  the  separation  of  powers  doctrine  emanating  most
famously  from  the  work  of  Montesquieu,17 under  which  it  is  believed  each  branch  of
government provides restraints and checks on the other, thus avoiding the arbitrary exercise
or  abuse  of  power.  It  is  perhaps  a  peculiar  aspect  of  democracies,  especially  those  with
written constitutions. It is certainly a feature of the Australian Constitution, a constitution
16 See Western Australia v Brown (2014) 253 CLR 507.
17 De Secondat, baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws (Thomas Nugent trans, Colonial Press, 1899) vol 1
[trans of: De L’espirit des Loix (first published 1748)]. 
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based on the United States Constitution which in turn adopted enlightenment principles to
that end when adopted in the late decades of the 18th century. 
Perhaps because parliament has the function of legislating, the idea that courts also make law
has been thought by some to be radical and illegitimate. The idea that judges might develop
legal  principles  having  regard  to  “policy”  informed  by  community  values  and  changing
circumstances has, I think, been seen by some to involve a usurping of the role of parliament.
In  my view,  if  ever  there  were a  time when courts  didn’t  make law,  it  must  have  been
momentary. The courts developed the common law and the principles of equity as time and
experience and the demands of commerce and the community required their development.
Judges have performed this function for a long time in the common law tradition. As the
famous United States Supreme Court Judge, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jnr has observed,18 the
common  law  develops  to  meet  the  circumstances  of  each  generation.  That  has  been
considered its genius.
Perhaps the real complaint is aimed more at judges who, in construing statutes, have found
meanings in the legislation made by parliament that don’t accord with the aims, intentions
and views of the executive empowered to administer those laws.
In that regard, judges, at different times, have been described as “activists”, on the one hand,
or as “black letter lawyers” on the other; the former usually intended to convey opprobrium,
the latter approbation.19  By the way, I have always liked to think of myself as an “activist,
black letter lawyer”!
But what do these labels or tags actually mean? Put very generally, the “black letter lawyer”
apparently is a version of a judge in that moment in time I have just referred to, who is
steeped in what the rules in a given area of law are, and simply applies them, inscrutably, to
the facts of the case before the judge. That, of course, begs the question as to what the facts
of the case before the judge are, because usually they are not agreed, or fully agreed, and the
judge has to find them.
18 O. W. Holmes Jr, The Common Law (Little, Brown, and Company, 1881) 36.
19 See Susan Kiefel, ‘The Judiciary and Change: 1982 to 2006’ in Aladin Rahemtula (ed), Justice According to
Law: A Festschrift for the Honourable Mr Justice BH McPherson CBE  (Supreme Court of Queensland Library,
2006) 386, 404.
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The “activist” judge is, apparently, a judge considered to have a clear, inevitably personal,
predisposed view as to what the outcome of a given case before him or her should be and is
able to contrive a plausible way to explain the law, the facts, or both in order to arrive at that
outcome.
Here I might observe that whether “black letter” or “activist”, the first thing a trial judge must
do is find the facts in relation to a dispute to which the law is to be applied. As the found facts
so often dictate outcomes, this is the first and perhaps the primary way in which a judge
influences, properly, the outcome of a dispute. It is of course the trial judge’s job to find facts,
to discover at least the legal truth of events in dispute.
A topic too large to deal with now, concerns the extent to which judges in our system of law
and government are trained in the art of fact finding and judging and, more generally, in
judicial methodology.
In my experience, however, trial judges assiduously consider all the evidence led in a case
and apply the time honoured tests of what the probabilities suggest happened in relation to
disputed events, with the applicant nearly always shouldering the burden of proving their case
on the balance of the probabilities. A judge’s findings are always limited by the extent of the
evidence the parties decide to lead.
I might add, I do not consider it easy for a trial judge artificially to force outcomes where the
principles of law governing a dispute are well settled and the facts are clear. Notions of who
has been treated unfairly or where the justice in the dispute seems to lie usually don’t arise in
such situations. Trial judges soon discover that you can’t hit a square peg into an evidentiary
or legal round hole, as much as you might like to do so on some occasions!
Of course, whether a judge is considered “black letter” or “activist” is all in the eye of the
beholder. If one transports oneself from the Australian legal environment, into the almost
mythical environment of the United States Supreme Court, where that country’s constitution
and Bill of Rights are regularly interpreted and applied, we may ask whether the judge who
finds,  as in  the 1954 decision of the United States Supreme Court in  Brown v Board of
Education of Topeka,20 that racial segregation in the US was unconstitutional, is “activist”; or
the judge who might seek to undo a ruling about such segregation in this new millennium
20 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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would be the “activist”. Perhaps the answer is that any judge in any setting who is considered
willing to undo some legal orthodoxy is considered “activist”.
In my time as a law student,  commencing in 1968, the views of Sir Owen Dixon, Chief
Justice of the High Court from 1952 to 1964, on the question of judicial method were highly
influential; and they still are. He was considered by many to be the quintessential black letter
lawyer, although I think he was much more than that. He wrote about the proper separation of
powers between the judicial, the executive and the legislative branches of government.  He
preached restraint, one might say, so far as judicial method was concerned. When reading
Dixon, I think it helps to remember the era in which he lived, through the Wars, when the
Australian polity was barely 50 years old; that while a serving judge on the High Court, he
also  served as  Australia’s  Minister  in  Washington;  and  that  after  WWII  he  accepted  the
challenge from the United Nations of trying to broker peace in Kashmir, a peace that still
eludes that part of the world.21
In his swearing in as Chief Justice in 1952, Dixon observed:
The High Court’s jurisdiction is divided in its exercise between constitutional and
federal cases which loom so largely in the public eye, and the great body of litigation
between man and man, or even man and government, which has nothing to do with
the Constitution, and which is the principal preoccupation of the court. Federalism
means a demarcation of  powers and this casts upon the court  a responsibility  of
deciding  whether  legislation  is  within  the  boundaries  of  allotted  powers.
Unfortunately  that  responsibility  is  very  widely  misunderstood,  misunderstood,
largely by the popular use and misuse of terms which are not applicable, and it is not
sufficiently recognised that the court’s sole function is to interpret a constitutional
description of power or restraint upon power and say whether a given measure falls
on one side of a line consequently drawn or on the other, and that it  has nothing
whatever to do with the merits or demerits of the measure. 
Such  a  function  has  led  us  all  I  think  to  believe  that  close  adherence  to  legal
reasoning  is  the  only  way  to  maintain  the  confidence  of  all  parties  in  Federal
conflicts. It may be that the court is thought to be excessively legalistic. I should be
sorry to think that it is anything else. There is no other safe guide to judicial decisions
21 Philip Ayres, Owen Dixon (Miegunyah Press, 2003) 193-6.
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in great conflicts than a strict and complete legalism.22
This statement came just a year after a majority of the Court, including Dixon, struck down
the Communist Party Dissolution legislation in the Communist Party case.23 
The statement obviously had everything to do with how the Court interprets the Constitution.
I  think it  may also be considered to apply to the interpretation of statutes.  But it  plainly
doesn’t extend to the rules that govern the “great body of litigation between man and man” to
which Dixon referred.
It is perhaps worth noting, that Owen Dixon, who at the time had not yet taken silk, was
counsel for the Commonwealth which intervened in the landmark Engineers case24 in 1920,
contending for a more literal construction of the Constitution devoid of any limitations to be
implied in the text.
In a lecture “Concerning judicial method”, delivered at Yale’s Howland Prize Ceremony on
19 September 1955, Dixon developed his theme however, on the common law, its traditions,
and what his biographer, Philip Ayres, described as “the perils it faces in the present, perils
precisely located”.25 This was at a time when Lord Denning was making a mark as an appeals
court judge in England.
Ayres writes that,26 reflecting the words of the legal historian Frederic Maitland, Dixon said
that the common law was “not common sense and the reflection of the layman’s unanalysed
instincts; rather … strict logic and high technique, rooted in the Inns of Court, rooted in the
Year Books, rooted in the centuries”. Dixon considered that there were many signs that the
strict logic and the high technique of the common law had fallen into disfavour – it appears
he had Denning firmly in his sights.
It  was Denning’s judgments that mostly attracted the condemnation of being instances of
palm tree justice through the 1950s and into the 60s.
You may ask yourselves whether the analysis that Dixon offered to his Yale audience in 1955,
of the then state of the world and its learning, resonates in our contemporary times and should
22 ‘Swearing in of Sir Owen Dixon as Chief Justice’ (1952) 85 CLR xi, xiii – xiv.
23 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1.
24 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129.
25 Philip Ayres, Owen Dixon (Miegunyah Press, 2003) 251.
26 Ibid.
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lead us to adopt an outlook similar to that Dixon was then promoting. Dixon suggested some
causes for why strict logic and high technique of the common law had fallen into disfavour.
He said: 
It is not an age in which men would respond to a system of fixed concepts, logical
categories, and prescribed principles of reasoning. In the exact sciences the faith is
gone which the nineteenth century is reputed to have held in the immutability of
ascertained and accepted truths. The conclusions of physical science are now held as
provisional  and  working  hypotheses. Even  more  tentative  are  the  fundamental
explanations of bacteriology and virology. Philosophy appears to have foregone the
search for reality and seldom speaks of the absolute. History concedes the validity of
a diversity of subjective interpretations. The visual arts tend to discard form as an
expression of aesthetic truth. Clearly, the intellectual climate is unfavourable to the
high technique of the common law, to say nothing of strict logic. It is certainly not a
time  when  many  minds  can  be  found  to  respond  with  lively  animation  to  an
encounter with tolled entry upon a descent cast, or with a demurrer to a plea giving
express colour on the ground that, lacking a protestando, the plea confesses but does
not  avoid a count in trespass;  or  even with the acceleration of a legal  contingent
remainder by the destruction of a prior contingent interest. We have turned in other
directions … The possession of fixed concepts is now seldom conceded to the law.
Rather, its principles are held to be provisional; its categories, however convenient or
comforting  in  forensic  or  judicial  life,  are  viewed  as  unreal  …  illusory  guides
formerly treated with undue respect.27
One needs to bear in mind that Dixon was speaking extra judicially and in a high minded
way. He was wanting to challenge some aspects of a changing, post-second war world. He
was plainly wanting to place a brake on what he saw as dangerous, or at least unthinking,
deviations of the historical development of the law.
Lord Denning was oft criticised in England and elsewhere in the common law world, for his
apparent lack of adherence to precedent. The House of Lords chided him more than once.
Academic lawyers, though, were in seventh heaven. Such high level disputation over legal
judicial  method  was  manna  from heaven  in  their  circles.28 However,  Lord  Denning  was
27 Ibid 251-2.
28 See, eg, Michael J Kirby, ‘Lord Denning and Judicial Activism’ (1999) 14(1) The Denning Law Journal 127;
Editor, ‘Lord Denning and Judicial Reform’ (1980) 20 Australian Law Reform Commission Reform Journal 115;
E W Thomas,  The Judicial  Process: Realism, Pragmatism, Practical Reasoning and Principles (Cambridge
University Press, 2009) 94–5.
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something of a popular hero in the law and may be considered the ultimate victor in this
dispute.  Lord  Wilberforce,  himself  a  reformer  of  the  law,  later  observed  that  70%  of
Denning’s decisions were upheld in the House of Lords, as were 70% of his dissents!29
The same broad debate over policy, values, justice and settled principles has continued in
Australia. The Mason High Court during the 1980s shifted away from what were seen to be
the strictures of the strict logic and high technique of the common law approach to judging.30
In  State Government Insurance Commission v Trigwell and Others31 in 1979, Sir Anthony
Mason gave a clear indication that in an appropriate case the High Court:
can and should vary or modify what has been thought to be a settled rule or principle
of the common law on the ground that it is ill-adapted to modern circumstances.32 
In that case, though, he and other members of the court considered there was no justification
for it to review the inherited common law rule that occupiers of land are under no duty of
care to  prevent  stock from straying onto  public  roads.  They pointed  out  that  the sort  of
question before them was one best left for parliaments to change, if it were to be.
The Mabo decision of the Mason court then followed 13 years later in 1992. Here the court
took the opportunity to remedy an historic wrong and effectively accepted that only it could
declare  the  common  law  and  did  not  choose  to  leave  the  question  of  recognition  of
indigenous land rights to the parliaments of Australia.
Native title indeed provides the example par excellence of judicial law making. The High
Court ultimately had no difficulty in finding that native title survived the coming of the new
British sovereign in Australia. Since the subsequent passage of the Native Title Act in 1993, it
has fallen to the courts to give its provisions practical meaning. The courts, from trial judges
to the Full Federal Court and the High Court, have put flesh on the bones of the Act. They
have decided what it means for an indigenous person to maintain a “connection” with their
country “by traditional law and custom’”, terms used in s 225 of the Act.33 They have decided
29 Attributed to Lord Wilberforce in an obituary: ‘Lord Wilberforce’, The Telegraph (online), 18 February 2003
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/ 1422358/Lord-Wilberforce.html>.
30 Gerard Brennan, ‘A Tribute to Sir Anthony Mason’ in Cheryl Saunders (ed),  Courts of Final Jurisdiction:
The Mason Court in Australia (Federation Press, 1996) 10, 12-3.
31 (1979) 142 CLR 617.
32 Ibid 633.
33 Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422.
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when  extinguishment,  whole  or  partial,  occurs.34 They  are  collectively  in  the  process  of
deciding how compensation paid under the Act should properly be assessed.35 
I might here make the point that because parliaments can amend the legislation they have
earlier  made,  courts  in  the  modern  era,  when  interpreting  statutes,  may  be  seen  to  be
relatively “bloodless” when doing so. The text of the statute is paramount.36 Judges should
not  decide  what  they  think  the  parliament  meant  to  say,  and  then  interpret  the  Act
accordingly.  If  an outcome is  inconvenient  from a  public  policy point  of  view,  so be it.
Parliament can alleviate the inconvenience. If a particular construction seems to deny justice,
parliament can right the wrong.
The decision of the full court of the Federal Court in McGlade v Native Title Registrar37 (of
which full court I was a member), in relation to the effectiveness of an agreement made by
the State of Western Australia with the Noongar People of the South West of the State, is a
case in point. The court found the agreement was not one recognised as an Indigenous Land
Use  Agreement  under  the  Native  Title  Act.  The  inconvenience  was  manifest.  The
Commonwealth  Parliament  immediately  moved to  amend the  Act  largely  with  bipartisan
political support.38
So I come to the end of the lecture.
The  lessons  I  have  conveyed  to  you  tonight  about  the  judicial  function,  arise  from my
learning them over the course of a 15 year judicial career.
Reassuringly, I have found over this time, while my judicial colleagues around Australia on
superior courts have arrived on their courts from a variety of professional backgrounds and
usually  without  any formal  training  as  judges,  they share  an  abiding commitment  to  the
concepts of the rule of law and equality before the law.
They accept the strictures of statutory interpretation I have referred to, but understand that the
general law is always evolving, just as the High Court demonstrated in Hewett v Court.
34 Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1; Western Australia v Brown & Ors (2014) 253 CLR 507.
35 Griffiths v Northern Territory of Australia (No 3)  [2016] FCA 900 (Mansfield J);  Northern Territory of
Australia v Griffiths [2017] FCAFC 106; applications for special leave to appeal to the High Court have been
filed, but are yet to be decided.
36 Federal Commissioner of  Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd  (2012) 250 CLR 503, 519 [39];
Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27, 46 [47].
37 [2017] FCAFC 10.
38 See Native Title Amendment (Indigenous Land Use Agreements) Act 2017 (Cth).
DO JUDGES MAKE LAW?
While judges are not free to make law as legislators, based on their personal views of the
dictates of justice, justice finds its way into the calculus that sees the general development of
legal rules and principles over time.
I consider that David Malcolm’s career in the law, as a lawyer and as a judge, clearly bears
out these observations.
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